In 2025, the Supreme Federal Court had 4.456 complaints and 1.503 habeas corpus petitions pending . The constitutional complaint, conceived as an exceptional remedy to protect the authority of the Court, began to circulate almost three times more than the historical instrument for defending liberty.
From 2000 to 2025, a total of 81.479 claims were filed with the Supreme Court. Almost half of them, 49,8%, were dismissed. Just over a quarter were ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
The number says something that every lawyer who litigates in a higher court needs to take seriously. The complaint has grown, become routine, and yet most petitions don't even get past the initial filing. The problem is rarely on the merits. It's on the admissibility of the case.
What is a complaint? And what is it not?
The complaint is provided for in Article 102, I, l, of the Constitution for the Supreme Federal Court (STF), and in Article 105, I, f, for the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), with procedural rules in Articles 988 to 993 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC ). It is not an appeal. It is an action within the original jurisdiction of the court, with exhaustive grounds for its admissibility.
There are four entry points to Article 988: preserving the jurisdiction of the court (item I), guaranteeing the authority of its decisions (item II), ensuring compliance with a binding precedent or a decision in concentrated control (item III), and guaranteeing compliance with a judgment rendered in an incident of resolution of repetitive demands or in an incident of assumption of jurisdiction (item IV).
Outside of this framework, a claim is not valid. It does not replace a rescissory action and, above all, does not function as a substitute for an appeal. The Supreme Federal Court (STF) constantly reaffirms this limitation, noting that the claim procedure is intended for the specific protection of the competence and authority of its decisions, and not for the correction of any error in judgment that could be challenged by the appropriate appeal.
Behind this lies a shift in nature that the operator cannot ignore. As Professor Georges Abboud of IDP argues, the claim has acquired an objective dimension: it not only protects the subjective interest of the claimant, but also the constitutional order itself, by guaranteeing the integrity of the Supreme Court's binding precedents. Those who handle the claim as a mere instrument of individual dissatisfaction are misinterpreting it from the outset.
Exhaustion of remedies and the admissibility of a constitutional complaint.
The most decisive filter is found in Article 988, § 5, II. No claim is admissible to ensure compliance with a judgment rendered in a repetitive appeal or with general repercussion when ordinary instances have not been exhausted. The Supreme Court gives this provision a restrictive interpretation, and recent jurisprudence is uniform in this regard.
The pattern repeats itself in ruling after ruling.
In February 2025, in Rcl 65.593 AgR , the First Panel denied further proceedings on a claim based on general repercussion without exhausting the applicable appeals at the origin. The same panel repeated this understanding in 2026, in Rcl 92.072 AgR , in Rcl 91.703 and, in June 2026, in Rcl 93.424 AgR and Rcl 93.274 AgR , both relating to Topic 1.232.
The diagnosis is always the same: lack of exhaustion of resources combined with the use of complaints as a shortcut to appeal leads to non-compliance.
The Second Panel clearly summarized the requirements. In the judgment of Rcl 89.332 AgR-second , of March 2026, relating to Topic 154, it established two objective criteria for the admissibility of the claim procedure in matters of general repercussion: the prior exhaustion of appeal remedies and the demonstration of the manifest error of the challenged decision. If either of these is lacking, the claim does not proceed.
This scenario gains an additional chapter in the Superior Court of Justice (STJ). In Rcl 36.476/SP, the Special Court established that a claim to the Court is not admissible to control the application of precedents in repetitive appeals. According to the STJ, control should occur in local instances, through the internal appeal of article 1.030, § 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Legal scholars criticize this solution, arguing that it weakens the precedent system, but it guides practice until a review is implemented.
For the lawyer, the practical application is straightforward. Before filing, it is necessary to verify whether ordinary appeals have been exhausted and whether there is anything resembling a glaring error in the case. Without these two elements, the constitutional complaint is unlikely to survive the admissibility review, and the client ends up paying for a document destined for dismissal.
Strict adherence, teratology, and other blockages
Even after overcoming the exhaustion of options, filters remain. The first is the strict adherence between the challenged act and the invoked paradigm. Without a real identity between the challenged decision and the Supreme Court precedent, the claim is unsustainable, even if the subject matter seems similar.
The second is teratology as a rare exception. The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that any error in the application of the general repercussion doctrine at the origin does not authorize a claim, except in cases of gross and evident error. This was established by the Second Panel in Rcl 72.788 AgR and Rcl 70.461 AgR , both from 2025. Disagreeing with the application of the issue is grounds for an appeal, not a claim.
There are also specific injunctions that save work for those who know them. The act that merely determines the suspension of the process at its origin, to await a paradigm of general repercussion, does not challenge a claim, according to Rcl 91.807 AgR , of 2026. A final and unappealable decision also closes the avenue, by virtue of Precedent 734 and article 988, § 5, I, as reaffirmed in Rcl 75.416 AgR . And no claim is admissible against decisions of the Supreme Court's own ministers or panels, an understanding already established in the Court.
Those who are well-versed in the narrow scope of constitutional appeals are better able to determine when it is worthwhile to file a complaint. The difference between an admitted and a dismissed claim, more often than not, lies not in the quality of the substantive argument, but in the accuracy of the procedural framing.
The border that is still in dispute.
Even if the scope narrows, the legitimacy remains open.
In April 2026, when judging Rcl 92.644, regarding the succession in the government of Rio de Janeiro, the plenary of the STF (Supreme Federal Court) was divided as to the scope of the expression "interested party" in article 988. Cristiano Zanin, Gilmar Mendes and Alexandre De Moraes defended a broad interpretation, whereby anyone affected by an act contrary to binding precedent can file a claim, even if they did not participate in the original proceedings. Luiz Fux dissented, arguing for a direct legal interest.
The broad interpretation has ancient roots, in the judgment of Rcl 1.880, and gained strength with the binding effect of decisions in concentrated control. It connects to the objective dimension already mentioned: if the claim protects the constitutional order, and not only the claimant, it makes sense to grant access to everyone affected by the non-compliance.
What remains open is considerable. The Supreme Court needs to balance two vectors in tension: the admissibility filter that prevents trivialization and the guarantee function that ensures the authority of precedents. It is no coincidence that Gilmar Mendes even suggested, in 2025, attributing binding effect to the claim itself. The institution continues to be under interpretative construction, and each new panel redefines some of its boundaries.
The postgraduate program in Constitutional Law at IDP
The complaint aptly illustrates why mastering the subject requires more than simply reading case summaries. It intersects constitutional civil procedure, precedent theory, and constitutional jurisdiction—three fields that operate simultaneously and whose articulation cannot be learned in a fragmented way.
The IDP's Stricto Sensu Graduate Program in Constitutional Law , which offers Master's and Doctoral degrees and has a grade of 5 from CAPES, was structured for this type of reflection.
The research line "Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Rule of Law" deals directly with jurisdiction and civil procedure within the constitutional order, with an emphasis on the role of the Superior Courts in standardizing interpretation.
The line of research on State, Constitution and Democracy discusses the use of precedents and judicial independence, precisely the terrain in which the claim operates.
The faculty includes those who produce the doctrine cited in the play and in class. Among them are Georges Abboud, PhD in Diffuse and Collective Rights and author of a seminal work on constitutional procedure; Gilmar Mendes, Supreme Court Justice and founder of IDP; and Luiz Wambier, PhD and proceduralist with a long career.
For those who intend to research, teach, or work in high-level consulting in constitutional jurisdiction, studying constitutional claims in this environment means participating in the construction of the field, and not just observing it from the outside.
The number of complaints will continue to grow, and the Supreme Court will continue to narrow its scope. Those who understand this boundary before filing a claim have an advantage over those who only discover the limit in the inadmissibility ruling.
Manassés Lopes da Silva is a business lawyer and university professor. He holds a Master's degree in Law from IDP/SP, a specialization in Civil Procedural Law from IDP, and an LLM in Processes and Appeals in Superior Courts. Email: contato@manasseslopes.com
