Principal investigator: Angelo Cruz do Nascimento Varella
Article title: WHEN PAYOUTS PAY OFF: CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN BRAZIL 2002-10
Author of the article: Cesar Zucco Jr.
Location of the intervention: Brazil
Sample size: 4 electoral cycles in all Brazilian municipalities
Sector: Economic Policy and Governance
Type of Intervention: The effects of the Bolsa Família program on Brazilian elections.
Primary variable of interest: Proportion of votes according to the Bolsa Família Program
Evaluation method: Others
Policy Problem
In Brazil, some of the public policies with the greatest social impact are the Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTPs). These initiatives encourage good practices in society while simultaneously redistributing wealth, ensuring that families from lower socioeconomic classes are largely benefited, leading to a reduction in poverty and an increase in social well-being. In Brazil, the Bolsa Família Program (PBF) is, at the time of this study, the largest program of its kind, making it a recurring subject of scientific studies regarding its effects and consequences.
One of the most relevant issues surrounding the Bolsa Família Program concerns its potential electoral influence, especially on the beneficiary families. Because it is a broad and highly popular program, researchers question whether the existence of this type of public policy can interfere with citizens' decision-making processes, generating clientelism that has the potential to affect elections.
Implementation and Evaluation Context
It can be argued that PCTRs (Prioritized Care for Children and Young People) represent one of the types of social public policies with the highest adoption and growth in developing countries. In 1995, two Brazilian cities, Brasília and Campinas, implemented cash payments to low-income families in accordance with a series of conditions proposed by the local governments, the most important of which were ensuring the school attendance of their children and frequent access to specific medical check-ups for preventive purposes.
Since then, dozens of other countries have instituted versions of PCTR, so that nationwide initiatives, such as Brazil's PBF and Mexico's "Progressa" program, serve millions of people in their respective countries, becoming central pillars in their social assistance systems.
Since research indicates that economic conditions affect a region's electoral outcomes, academics have become interested in analyzing the influence that such welfare-oriented public policies have on the democracies that adopt them. Other studies conducted in various countries, such as Germany, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay, demonstrate that welfare-oriented public policies have the capacity to generate positive short-term results in elections, but there is no evidence that this trend is lasting or that it is linked to the political parties that implemented them, even when the program remains in effect.
Policy Details
Throughout Fernando Henrique Cardoso's presidency, Brazil already had several established programs for the removal of children working in coal industries. In 1996, the government initiated a pilot program of this kind to remove children working in coal mines, later expanding the initiative to mitigate other forms of child labor. In 1997, the government launched the program that, in 2001, became Bolsa Escola (School Grant), with the goal of ensuring school attendance. Soon after, Bolsa Alimentação (Food Grant) was created, with conditions focused on the health of the beneficiaries.
Even with the implementation of all these important social programs, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva was elected in 2002 and, the following year, created the Ministry of Social Development (MDS). This body is responsible for unifying the registry of all beneficiaries of social assistance programs, called the Unified Registry, and forms the basis for the gradual creation of the Bolsa Família Program. In October 2006, the Bolsa Família Program served more than 40 million individuals from 11 million families, which corresponds to more than 20% of the Brazilian population.
Families with a per capita income below $70 per month and children up to 15 years old can register for the Bolsa Família program. Pregnant women and extremely poor families also qualify. Although rare, the program could pay up to $120 per month at the time.
Methodology Details
The researchers used data on the coverage of the Bolsa Família Program (PBF) in Brazilian municipalities, as well as the amount allocated to each locality, and correlated this information with the municipal results of the presidential elections. In this way, it is possible to ascertain the impact that the existence of these social assistance programs has on the votes in Brazilian cities.
In total, the presidential races of 2002, 2006, and 2010 were analyzed, with the 1998 elections used as a control parameter, since the implementation of the PCTR (Performance-Based Trials) was not yet national in scope. The authors also used other statistical methods to ensure the validity of the proposed models.
Results
The main finding from the analyses indicates that the PBF (Programa Bolsa Família) benefits candidates already in power. However, it should be noted that, as described in the academic literature, this effect dissipates over time and does not necessarily benefit the creators of the legislation, often being associated with changes or integrations of existing programs. It should also be noted that, in elections, the simple promise to maintain or expand the PCTR (Programa Bolsa Família) may be sufficient to garner votes.
Analysis of PBF expenditures showed that, in 2002, for every 100 reais increase in per capita spending, the share of votes increased by 15 percentage points. However, in 2010, this ratio progressively decreased to 6,5 percentage points. Regarding the program's coverage in terms of the percentage of families served, the results remained stable.
Another relevant factor in the analysis demonstrates that, despite benefiting incumbent politicians who are running for president, the PBF does not improve the performance of candidates for legislative positions, nor does it increase identification with specific political parties.
Lessons in Public Policy
The article presents interesting results for the political landscape in Brazil. Regarding the PCTRs (Partnership and Reform Initiatives), present in Brazilian politics for the last few decades, it's possible to affirm that there is a real and observable impact of these initiatives on presidential elections, benefiting incumbent politicians in the short term.
However, it should be noted that these effects do not occur in the long term and are weakened by a number of variables, such as the willingness of opposition candidates to maintain, or even expand, the PCTRs. Nor is there any perceived partisan influence of this type of policy, nor a permanent preference among voters for the creators of such programs, so the argument that public policies like the PBF cause clientelism is poorly supported by empirical analysis.
Finally, it is worth highlighting the social impact of these public policies. Not only do they effectively combat poverty by proactively working towards income redistribution, but they also increase social well-being through control, monitoring, and the encouragement of good social practices. It is no coincidence that such programs are well-regarded by voters, as they promote real change. However, such measures are not sufficient to perpetuate voting intentions, which are, in general, good news for democracy.
Reference
ZUCCO JR, Cesar. When payouts pay off: Conditional cash transfers and voting behavior in Brazil 2002–10. American journal of political science, vol. 57, no. 4, p. 810-822, 2013.
